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On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found the TMDL standard
to be a rule. The court paraphrased the statutory definition of an
administrative rule by stating that agency action becomes a rule when
the agency's statement applies generally and implements law. The
court adopted the factors the district court used to determine whether
the TMDL standard formed a rule. Those factors included "(1) wide
coverage, (2) applied generally and uniformly, (3) operates only in
future cases, (4) prescribes a legal standard or directive not otherwise
provided by the enabling statute, (5) expresses agency policy not
previously expressed, and (6) is an interpretation of law or general
policy." The court applied all of these factors to the TMDL standard
and found that each factor was present; therefore, the TMDL standard
was a rule. Because DEQ did not follow the IAPA statutorily required
rule-making procedures, the court then voided the rule.
In addition, the court held that Asarco properly sought declaratory
relief before exhausting administrative remedies. The IAPA states that
when an administrative agency interferes with or impairs the rights of a
party, that party may seek judicial review and declaratory relief. DEQ's
application of the TMDL standard modified permits of two of the
mining companies. Because DEQ interfered with Asarco's rights, the
court permitted Asarco to seek declaratory relief without exhausting its
administrative remedies. Therefore, the court affirmed the district
court's findings and awarded costs on appeal to Asarco.
Robert E. Wells

Sagewillow v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 70 P.3d 669 (Idaho 2003)
(holding water resource department improperly applied the
resumption of use doctrine, and remanding for water resource
department to reconsider resumption of use as well as to reconsider
whether plaintiff forfeited some of its water rights through nonuse).
Appellant Sagewillow, Inc. ("Sagewillow") filed seven groundwater
transfer applications, seeking a change in the places of use of those
rights. Respondents James Mays, Mays Land and Livestock, and the
Blaine County Canal Company (collectively, "Mays") protested
Sagewillow's applications. Mays claimed Sagewillow forfeited its rights
due to nonuse. The Department of Water Resources ("Department")
granted some of Sagewillow's transfer requests, but held Sagewillow
either partially or completely forfeited the remaining rights. After the
District Court for the Seventh Judicial District affirmed the
Department's ruling, Sagewillow appealed to the Idaho Supreme
Court. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
the Department misapplied the resumption of use doctrine and
directing the Department to reconsider and issue findings as to
whether the evidence supported the Department's forfeiture finding.
In 1989, Sagewillow purchased four properties: Knollin Ranch,
Bird Ranch, North of Road Place, and Homestead Place. In 1993,

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Sagewillow purchased one additional property, known as Frew Place.
The water rights appurtenant to the Knollin Ranch and Bird Ranch
properties consisted of fifteen surface water rights and two
groundwater rights, with priority dates ranging from 1906 to 1957.
The North of Road Place and Homestead Place properties each
included one groundwater right, with priority dates of 1959 and 1960,
respectively. Frew Place included two groundwater rights, with priority
dates of 1959 and 1972.
After Sagewillow purchased the properties, it began increasing the
number of acres irrigated on those properties. The water rights for
the five properties were capable of irrigating 2383 acres. However, for
twenty years before Sagewillow's purchase, the previous owners only
irrigated 1412 acres. After Sagewillow purchased the properties, it
began increasing the number of irrigated acres, to 2000 acres in 1991,
2100 acres in 1992, and 2390 acres in 1993.
As it increased the number of acres irrigated on the properties,
Sagewillow also filed transfer applications.
In 1990, it filed an
uncontested transfer application to change both the place of use and
point of diversion for one groundwater right. The Department
granted that application in 1992. In 1994, Sagewillow filed seven
additional transfer applications, to which Mays objected.
The
Department held proceedings to determine whether some of
In its ruling, the
Sagewillow's water rights had been forfeited.
Department held some of Sagewillow's rights partially forfeited and
others totally forfeited, and limited Sagewillow's irrigation to 1412
acres.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed four issues: (1)
whether the Department correctly applied the resumption of use
doctrine, (2) whether "substantial and competent" evidence supported
the Department's forfeiture finding, (3) whether the Department
erred in voiding the transfer application it originally granted in 1992,
and (4) whether the Department could be a party to a review of its
decision.
The court first addressed whether the Department correctly
applied the resumption of use doctrine. The resumption of use
doctrine allows a party to avoid forfeiture after a five-year period of
nonuse if the party resumes its use prior to a claim of right by a third
party. The Department argued resumption of use only applied if no
junior appropriators existed "in the same or an interconnected water
source." Further, the Department argued, where such a junior
appropriator existed, that junior need not have done anything to
assert a claim of right; the existence of the junior right by itself was
sufficient. The court disagreed. The court held that, in addition to
holding a junior right, the user must also "have used the water for a
beneficial purpose." In its ruling, the Department failed to include
findings supporting ajunior's use of Sagewillow's water for a beneficial
purpose. The court directed the Department to do so upon remand.
The court then addressed, as a matter of first impression, what
constituted a "claim of right." The court cited to and discussed the
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only three cases in which it applied the resumption of use doctrine.
Based on those cases, the court held that a party makes a claim of right
if the party "has either instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture,
or has obtained a valid water right authorizing the use of such water
with a priority date prior to the resumption of use, or has used the
water pursuant to an existing water right." The court directed the
Department to reconsider these criteria upon remand.
The court next addressed whether evidence supported the
Department's forfeiture finding. The party asserting forfeiture must
prove it by clear and convincing evidence. Although the Department
made findings that Mays established forfeiture of two of the water
rights by clear and convincing evidence, the Department failed to
include findings of clear and convincing evidence for the other water
rights.
Further, a water right is not forfeited if nonuse is due to
Sagewillow argued no
circumstances beyond the user's control.
evidence existed to show water had been available during the five-year
period of nonuse. Because the Department failed to find water had
been available to juniors during the period of nonuse, the court
directed the Department to review this issue on remand.
The court then addressed whether the Department erred in
voiding, during the underlying proceeding, one of Sagewillow's
transfer requests the Department originally approved in 1992. The
Department voided that transfer after finding the right forfeited prior
to its approval of the transfer. Sagewillow argued it could not void the
approved transfer due to res judicata and collateral estoppel. The
court disagreed. Such a ruling would require the Department to
investigate forfeiture each time a party filed a transfer application, a
substantial burden. Because no party actually raised forfeiture during
the original transfer proceeding, the court held that the Department
did not err in voiding its original approval.
Finally, Sagewillow argued the Department could not participate in
the appeal. The court looked to the statutory definitions of "party,"
which included "a person or agency," and "person," which included a
"governmental subdivision or agency," and held that the Department
was properly a party to Sagewillow's appeal.
For the above reasons, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the
Department's order and remanded the case to the Department for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Brian L. Martin

